KS5- History Bridging work

A Level History A H505

This transitional work MUST be completed by the time you start your course and it will be assessed in September.

The aims are for you to be ready to start learning at A level.

Department expectations:

- The department expect from you to demonstrate positive behaviour and attitude, put maximum effort into your work, be highly organised and punctual, hand homework in promptly, use a wide range of resources, and revise thoroughly for all assessments.

Assessment:

- You will be assessed internally on a regular basis within class tests shortly after a Key Topic has been completed

- You will be set homework regularly. This course is 80% examination and 20% coursework. The table shows a full breakdown of the A level History course:

OCR A Level History

A level A2 – 200 marks available	Content
Year 12. **Unit 1 British Period Study** Britain c.1930-1997 (Churchill) 25% of A Level 90 minute exam (50 marks)	1) Churchill - Churchill's' view of events 1929-1940 - Churchill as a wartime Prime Minister - Churchill and international diplomacy 1939-1951 2) Britain -Conservative dominions 1951-1979 - Labour and conservative government's 1964-1979 -Thatcher and the end of consensus 1979-1997 - Britain's position in the world 1951-1997
Year 12. **Unit 2 Non-British Period Study** The French Revolution and the Rule of Napoleon. 15% of A Level 60 minute exam (30 marks)	1) The causes of the French Revolution from 1774 and the events of 1789. 2) The Revolution from October 1789 to the Directory 1795 3) Napoleon Bonaparte to 1807 4) The decline and fall of Napoleon 1807
Year 13. **Unit 3 Thematic Study** Civil Rights in the USA 1865-1992 40% of A Level 2.5 hour exam (80 marks)	1) African Americans 2) Trade Unions 3) Native Americans 4) Women
Year 13. **Non-exam assessment** Historical Investigation 20% of A Level 3000-4000 words (40 marks)	Lessons will take place in a computer room to work on their coursework with teacher guidance and supervision but it is imperative that students work on this independently outside of the lesson time. Students will be given a choice of essay question from a list

Unit 1: Britain c.1930-1997 (Churchill)

A-Level Bridging work: Churchill 1930 - 45

In this section of the course you will study Churchill's political life. Starting with what are known as his wilderness years (1929-39), then looking at his role as a Wartime Prime Minister (1940-45) and finally looking at his, albeit temporary, fall from power.

For the Churchill part of the course will need you to develop a high-level understanding of Churchill's later career and a keen analytical eye for using and judging detailed historical sources. In preparation for this read the extract below on Churchill's career and complete the attached tasks.

1. Read through the extract and highlight any key words that you don't know. Write a list of the key words then look up and write the definitions of them.
2. Create a timeline summarising the key events in Churchill's political life from 1929 – 40.
3. Source Work - Using the information in the extract and your source skills from GCSE, analyse the source at the end of the extract.
    a. Annotate the information in the source using evidence from the above extract. What is accurate about the source, what is missing from the source?
    b. Annotate the provenance (where the source comes from). Do you trust this source to be truthful?
    c. Write a short paragraph analysing the source's usefulness for learning about Churchill's wilderness years. Focus on what the source tells us, whether the source is accurate and complete, and whether the source is trustworthy and authentic.

Churchill in the Wilderness: 1929–1939

The decade between 1929 and 1939 forms one of the most paradoxical chapters in Winston Churchill's long political life. Out of power and frequently out of favour, this was nevertheless a period in which his voice—often derided, sometimes ridiculed—persistently insisted on truths that others preferred not to hear. His trajectory during these ten years was not one of political ascent but rather of deepening isolation, through which, with characteristic stubbornness and flair, he preserved his political relevance in ways that would later prove decisive.

Churchill left office in 1929 with the fall of Stanley Baldwin's Conservative government. Having served as Chancellor of the Exchequer with what might generously be called mixed results, he found himself on the backbenches of a Parliament increasingly indifferent to his Victorian certainties. The interwar years were not kind to Churchill's brand of politics. The aristocratic, imperial vision he inherited and espoused seemed increasingly archaic in the face of new democratic and nationalist movements, none more so than in India. Churchill's opposition to the gradual granting of self-government to India, culminating in his fierce resistance to the Government of India Bill of 1935, was perhaps his most consistent cause of the period—but also the one that most compromised his credibility within the mainstream of Conservative politics.

It was not merely that Churchill opposed Indian reform; it was the tone and tenor of his opposition that marked him out as a relic of an earlier age. He dismissed Gandhi as a "seditious fakir" and described the bill as a betrayal of British imperial duty. Yet this was no mere rhetorical posturing. His arguments, grounded in the belief that India was not ready for self-rule and that imperial retreat would diminish Britain's global standing, reflected a sincere—if misguided—worldview. It was a stance that further isolated him from the political leadership of the Conservative Party and placed him at odds with much of the British public, who were more receptive to the notion of a gradual devolution of power.

If Churchill's views on India marginalised him, his prescience on Germany came to define the significance of these wilderness years. From the early 1930s, and with increasing urgency after Hitler's assumption of power in 1933, Churchill warned of the resurgence of German militarism. While many around him clung to the illusions of Versailles as a settled peace, Churchill—through a mixture of instinct and information, not least from informal sources within the civil service—saw the danger of Nazi rearmament. Nowhere was his focus sharper than on air defence. As other parliamentarians continued to believe that war could be averted through diplomacy, Churchill argued for an urgent and substantial increase in British air strength, understanding earlier than most that the next war, if it came, would be decided in the skies.

His warnings, however, were not warmly received. The British political class, still reeling from the trauma of the First World War, was in no mood for a renewed confrontation, and Churchill's interventions were dismissed as alarmist. His position was not helped by his own difficult temperament—prickly, theatrical, and often condescending towards those he disagreed with. As such, even when events began to prove him right, his standing remained precarious.

Nowhere was Churchill more isolated than during the peak years of **appeasement**, a policy pursued most zealously by Neville Chamberlain. The Munich Agreement of 1938, which ceded the Sudetenland to Hitler, was greeted with widespread acclaim at home. Chamberlain's declaration of "peace for our time" resonated with a public desperate to avoid another war. Churchill, almost alone, stood to denounce the agreement not only as a moral failure but as a strategic calamity. "You were given the choice between war and dishonour," he famously declared. "You chose dishonour, and you will have war." At the time, it seemed bitter and anachronistic. In retrospect, it was tragically prophetic.

Throughout these years, Churchill's primary platform was not the Commons, where he was increasingly an outsider, but the written word. He devoted himself to a variety of literary projects—including his monumental biography of Marlborough—and kept his voice alive through journalism and public speaking. These were not idle diversions. They kept his mind sharp, his arguments public, and his persona within the national consciousness. Even in retreat, Churchill never entirely disappeared.

When war finally came in September 1939, the return of Churchill to high office—once again as First Lord of the Admiralty—was as abrupt as it was vindicating. The nation, having spent a decade ignoring his warnings, now turned instinctively to the man who had never stopped sounding the alarm. His reinstatement marked not only the end of the wilderness years but also the beginning of the most consequential chapter in his career.

In sum, Churchill between 1929 and 1939 was a figure of increasing eccentricity but also of remarkable foresight. His imperialism blinded him to the currents of political change in some quarters, yet his understanding of geopolitical danger was unmatched. These years, though lonely, did not break him. Rather, they honed the qualities—resilience, rhetorical mastery, and moral clarity—that would, in Britain's darkest hour, elevate him from irrelevance to indispensability.

The start of WWII and Churchill as PM

In a sense, the whole of Churchill's previous career had been a preparation for wartime leadership. An intense patriot; a romantic believer in his country's greatness and its historic role in Europe, the empire, and the world; a devotee of action who thrived on challenge and crisis; a student, historian, and veteran of war; a statesman who was master of the arts of politics, despite or because of long political exile; a man of iron constitution, inexhaustible energy, and total concentration, he seemed to have been nursing all his faculties so that when the moment came he could lavish them on the salvation of Britain and the values he believed Britain stood for in the world.

On September 3, 1939, the day Britain declared war on Germany, Chamberlain appointed Churchill to his old post in charge of the Admiralty. The signal went out to the fleet: "Winston is back." On September 11 Churchill received a congratulatory note from Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt and replied over the signature "Naval Person"; a memorable correspondence had begun. At once Churchill's restless energy began to be felt throughout the administration, as his ministerial colleagues as well as his own department received the first of those pungent minutes that kept the remotest corners of British wartime government aware that their shortcomings were liable to detection and penalty. All his efforts, however, failed to energize the torpid Anglo-French entente during the so-called "phony war," the period of stagnation in the European war before the German seizure of Norway in April 1940. The failure of the Narvik and Trondheim expeditions, dependent as they were on naval support, could not but evoke some memories of the Dardanelles and Gallipoli, so fateful for Churchill's reputation in World War I. This time, however, it was Chamberlain who was blamed, and it was Churchill who endeavoured to defend him.

The German invasion of the Low Countries, on May 10, 1940, came like a hammer blow on top of the Norwegian fiasco. Chamberlain resigned. He wanted Lord Halifax, the foreign secretary, to succeed him, but Halifax wisely declined. It was obvious that Churchill alone could unite and lead the nation, since the Labour Party, for all its old distrust of Churchill's anti-Socialism, recognized the depth of his commitment to the defeat of Hitler. A coalition government was formed that included all elements save the far left and right. It was headed by a war cabinet of five, which included at first both Chamberlain and Halifax—a wise but also magnanimous recognition of the numerical strength of Chamberlainite conservatism—and two Labour leaders, Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood. The appointment of Ernest Bevin, a tough trade-union leader, as minister of labour guaranteed cooperation on this vital

front. Offers were made to Lloyd George, but he declined them. Churchill himself took, in addition to the leadership of the House of Commons, the Ministry of Defence. The pattern thus set was maintained throughout the war despite many changes of personnel. The cabinet became an agency of swift decision, and the government that it controlled remained representative of all groups and parties. The Prime Minister concentrated on the actual conduct of the war. He delegated freely but also probed and interfered continuously, regarding nothing as too large or too small for his attention. The main function of the chiefs of the armed services became that of containing his great dynamism, as a governor regulates a powerful machine; but, though he prodded and pressed them continuously, he never went against their collective judgment. In all this, Parliament played a vital part. If World War II was strikingly free from the domestic political intrigues of World War I, it was in part because Churchill, while he always dominated Parliament, never neglected it or took it for granted. For him, Parliament was an instrument of public persuasion on which he played like a master and from which he drew strength and comfort.

On May 13 Churchill faced the House of Commons for the first time as prime minister. He warned members of the hard road ahead—"I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat"—and committed himself and the nation to all-out war until victory was achieved. Behind this simplicity of aim lay an elaborate strategy to which he adhered with remarkable consistency throughout the war. Hitler's Germany was the enemy; nothing should distract the entire British people from the task of effecting its defeat. Anyone who shared this goal, even a Communist, was an acceptable ally. The indispensable ally in this endeavour, whether formally at war or not, was the United States. The cultivation and maintenance of its support was a central principle of Churchill's thought. Yet whether the United States became a belligerent partner or not, the war must be won without a repetition for Britain of the catastrophic bloodlettings of World War I; and Europe at the conflict's end must be re-established as a viable, self-determining entity, while the Commonwealth should remain as a continuing, if changing, expression of Britain's world role. Provided these essentials were preserved, Churchill, for all his sense of history, was surprisingly willing to sacrifice any national shibboleths—of orthodox economics, of social convention, of military etiquette or tradition—on the altar of victory. Thus, within a couple of weeks of this crusading anti-Socialist's assuming power, Parliament passed legislation placing all "persons, their services and their property at the disposal of the Crown"—granting the government in effect the most sweeping emergency powers in modern British history.

The effort was designed to match the gravity of the hour. After the Allied defeat and the evacuation of the battered British forces from Dunkirk, Churchill warned Parliament that invasion was a real risk to be met with total and confident defiance. Faced with the swift collapse of France, Churchill made repeated personal visits to the French government in an attempt to keep France in the war, culminating in the celebrated offer of Anglo-French union on June 16, 1940. When all this failed, the Battle of Britain began on July 10. Here Churchill was in his element, in the firing line—at fighter headquarters, inspecting coast defenses or antiaircraft batteries, visiting scenes of bomb damage or victims of the Blitz, smoking his cigar, giving his V sign, or broadcasting frank reports to the nation, laced with touches of grim Churchillian humour and splashed with Churchillian rhetoric. The nation took him to its heart; he and they were one in "their finest hour."

Source Work

"Winston continues to conduct himself as if Parliament were a stage and he the only actor upon it. His speeches—thunderous, dramatic, and invariably dire—betray not only a relish for conflict but a remarkable incapacity for constructive policy. He declaims endlessly on Germany and rearmament, as though volume might substitute for coherence, and urgency for evidence.

He has, time and again, shown poor judgement—whether in opposing Indian reform, cheerleading for the abdicated King, or now demanding we prepare for war as if it were inevitable. The truth is, Winston thrives in chaos. He is not a statesman, but a romantic adventurer—restless, impulsive, and fundamentally unfit for the discipline of responsible government.

I fear his appetite for war is matched only by his desperation to be proved right. Fortunately, the nation is not yet ready to take its lead from the man who has been wrong so often and so loudly."

Private Letter from Neville Chamberlain to Sir Horace Wilson, June 1938

Unit 2: The French Revolution and the Rule of Napoleon.

Task One. Page 8 and 10:

Make a copy of the mind map below and use the information on to add detail to it, showing how French society was divided before 1789



Task Two. Page 8.

Below are a series of assertions. Add a justification to each of the assertions to turn each one into an argument

The first two estates had too much privilege because…

The peasanty was particularly harmed because…

Middle-class grievances were important because…

Task Three. Page 10.

"Before 1789, the French monarchy was absolute in theory but not in practice" How far do you agree?	
The power of the king was more apparent than actual because…	**The monarchy was abolute because..**

Task Three. Page 12.

1. **Annotate the paragraph below with additional information.**

The financial problems remained such a problem because different royal ministers with different views about the issue could not find a permanent solution and their reforms caused unrest and opposition which the King could not overcome. The determination of the privileged classes not to accept any change which would seem to undermine their privilege was another important factor. They portrayed financial reform as 'tyranny' and undermined attempts by ministers to make changes. Also, the continuing failure to get reform led Louis to agree to special assemblies to discuss the issue and get agreement. This was to prove a major problem because when other meetings failed, he agreed to call the Estates General.

Task Four. Page 14.

"Had the Enlightenment put forward a real programme for political change? Probably not, but there is no denying that the Enlightenment encouraged probing criticism and led to calls for reform" Francis Ford, Europe 1780-1830. (1970)

1. What is the view of the interpretation?
2. What knowledge of your own do you have that supports the interpretation?
3. What knowledge of your own do you have that challenges the interpretation?

Task Five. Page 16.

Make a copy of the mind map and use the information on page 19 and add detail to it.



Task Six. Page 18.

1. **Annotate the paragraph below with additional information**

The challenge to royal authority came about for many long- and short-term reasons. Though social and economic grievances were important in creating discontent and a demand for change, they were not the most important factors. The years 1787-89 saw a great deal of hardship and high prices, which increased discontent. However, it was not so much social and economic grievances but political factors which led to revolution. The financial crisis more than social and economic grievances was the key factor, but this was linked to other factors such as the state of the economy, resentments in society and the weakness of the King.

Task Seven. Page 20.

"The King was to blame for the escalation of the Revolution in 1789" How far do you agree?

	Support	**Challenge**
The Third Estate demanded that voting should be by head not order		
The Third Estate were shut out of their meeting room and went to swear an oath on a nearby tennis court		
Louis dismissed Necker		
There were radical orators like Desmoulins who stirred up popular feeling		
Louis moved troops into the Paris/ Versailles region		
The Estates General declared themselves a National Assembly		
A Paris Commune and a National Guard were set up		
The Bastille was stormed on the 14th July		
Louis accepted the National Assembly, the Commune and the National Guard.		

Task Eight. Page 22

"*Whatever the mix of motivations in the minds of the deputies, there can be no doubt that it was the 'night of the 4th August' that tore the ancient regime to shreds. It gave the deputies confidence to hack away at other priveleges'* PM Jones, The French Revolution 2003

1. What is the view of the interpretation?

2. What knowledge of your own do you have that supports the interpretation?
3. What knowledge of your own do you have that challenges the interpretation?

Task Nine. Page 24.

Summarise what happened in each heading into one sentence:

The Suspensive Veto

Unrest in Paris

The King insults the Revolution

The march to Versailles

The results of the October Days.